We examine the importance of group membership in stigma and its role in the eectiveness of self-protective cognitions in three experiments. In Experiment 1, men are asked to interact with an attractive female who will judge their value as a potential date, and either eat a mint or a clove of raw garlic prior to the interview. Although the stigmatized-by-garlic men discounted negative feedback and attributed it to their garlic breath, discounting and attributions were negatively correlated with self-esteem. In Experiment 2, White participants were evaluated positively or negatively by a bogus partner who the participants believed had been told that the participant was either White or Black. Although participants receiving negative feedback engaged in several self-protective cognitions, including attributing their negative feedback to racism, the strategies were uncorrelated with self-esteem. In Experiment 3, women prepared to interact via computer with a partner who expressed sexist or non-sexist beliefs. In the absence of feedback, self-esteem increased when their partner was sexist. In contrast with the ®rst two experiments, perceiving the partner as prejudiced was signi®cantly and positively correlated with self-esteem. Together, these experiments suggest that selfprotective cognitions ®nd their eectiveness when stigma has a basis in group membership.
failedÐin a rather spectacular wayÐis that people who live with signi®cant social stigmas do not suer from a negative sense of self, despite what their cultures might say about their individual social value (Crocker & Major, 1989) . Although stigmatized people suer from a variety of social indignities (Goman, 1963; Stangor & Crandall, in press; Wright, 1960 Wright, , 1983 , many people with signi®cant, visible, and socially important stigmas do not suer from low self-esteem or a negative sense of identity. Crocker and Major's (1989) essay described the healthy self-esteem of stigmatized individuals and the reasons for the lack of esteem de®cit; their theory has had a strong in¯uence on subsequent research and theorizing. They argue that several selfprotective cognitions provide a buer from the negative social information individuals receive, and that these strategies are responsible for protecting their self-esteem from the negative eects of personal discrimination based on stigma. In contrast, we propose that mistreatment by an unstigmatized person can make salient a group membership that, although stigmatizing, is important and self-relevant, and this group salience is the actual force underlying the eectiveness of self-protective cognitions.
SELF-PROTECTIVE STRATEGIES
Crocker and Major suggested three strategies that help preserve high levels of selfesteem: (1) attributing negative feedback to prejudice against one's group, (2) limiting social comparison to ingroup members, and (3) selectively devaluing those dimensions on which the group stereotypically fairs poorly. For example, a businesswoman who receives negative feedback about her leadership skills from her male colleague might attribute this feedback to his sexist attitudes. Similarly, the businesswoman might decide that, although the feedback she received was negative, it was more positive than feedback given to other female employees at the company. Or she could decide that leadership skills aren't that important anyway. In each instance, the individual's selfesteem is protected from the blow that would be received by the negative feedback through the reinterpretation of damaging information. In all three cases, a cognitive strategy is used to undermine the information value of the negative feedback.
Evidence for the use of these strategies has been found in the laboratory. For example, physically attractive women were given positive feedback on an essay from an opposite sex partner who was`romantically unattached but looking', who could either see the participant or not (Major, Carrington, & Carnevale, 1984) . The attractive participants discounted the feedback when they were seen, as compared to when they were not seen. Similarly, women who received negative feedback from a sexist evaluator reported less depressive aect than women receiving negative feedback from someone who was not sexist (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991) . However, the expected buering eects with self-esteem were not found.
example of self-protective strategies mentioned by Crocker and Major (1989) , group membership is an essential component. For example, when making an attribution to prejudice against one's own group, the individual needs ®rst to consider oneself a member of a particular stigmatized group. Restricting social comparison to one's ingroup logically requires group membership to be salient. Finally, valuing the things that one's group does well in devaluing dimensions on which the group does poorly both entail thinking about one's group membership. Although the importance of group membership is implicit in Crocker and Major's (1989) review of self-protective strategies, we suggest that the eectiveness of these strategies is rooted in their association with an identity-relevant group membership.
We propose that the reason why these strategies were not eective for overweight women and European±Americans is that these two categories of people do not identify themselves with a meaningful group. Although groups are forming to ®ght for civil rights and respect for overweight individuals, many people may be hesitant to identify themselves with overweight individuals as a group, possibly because they hope to escape membership in such a group in the future. In the case of European± Americans, being members of the majority ethnic group may keep them from thinking of themselves as a meaningful group. Majority group members may not always be accustomed to thinking of themselves in terms of their group identity (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) . If meaningful group membership is integral to the eectiveness of Crocker and Major's (1989) self-protective strategies, then under most circumstances European±Americans would not bene®t from employing these strategies. However, individuals belonging to stigmatized groups such as African± Americans or women are reminded daily of their group identity. Stigmatization based on these meaningful group memberships may make that membership salient, thus protecting self-esteem.
Hence it is possible that meaningful group membership is the driving force behind self-protective cognitions. Rather than raising self-esteem through external attributions, self-protective cognitions such as attributions to prejudice function to remind stigmatized individuals of their social identi®cation with their in-group. This reminder of a valued in-group raises the individual's self-esteem. Therefore, it may be mechanisms associated with social identi®cation (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Tajfel, 1981) , not attribution, that function to preserve stigmatized individuals' selfesteem.
Therefore, we predict that individuals faced with prejudice on the basis of a meaningless group membership will engage in self-protective cognitions, but not reap the self-esteem buering rewards of these strategies. On the other hand, individuals reminded of a meaningful group membership should experience a preservation of selfesteem in the absence of the use of any attributional, self-protective strategies.
OVERVIEW OF THE THREE EXPERIMENTS
To test the roles of meaningful group membership and self-protective cognitions in buering self-esteem, we report three studies that systematically varied the meaningfulness of group membership. Speci®cally, we were interested in two issues. First, we examined how dierent kinds of stigmas and situations elicited dierent
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patterns of self-protective responses. Second, we examined the relationship between these self-protective cognitions and self-esteem: Are the cognitions sucient in themselves to buer self-esteem, or is a link to group membership necessary to make the strategies eective?
In the ®rst experiment, we gave people an individualizing stigma that was devoid of plausible group identi®cation (bad breath). This allowed participants to engage in self-protective cognitions, but aorded little access to the bene®ts of group membership.
In a second experiment, we gave people a stigma that carried with it a group membership with which the participants could not reasonably identify (being a member of a dierent race). Although group membership was central to this manipulation of stigma, the membership was not meaningful to the participants themselves, since they by de®nition were not members of the opposite race and therefore had low group identity with this race.
In a third experiment, we created an experimental situation that turned a genuine, but often non-stigmatizing group membership (being female) into something stigmatizing in situ. In this experiment, we highlighted female group membership by the presence of a sexist evaluator, but we did not provide the participant an opportunity to attribute feedback to prejudice. This allowed us to see if making a meaningful group membership salientÐin and of itselfÐwould be enough to promote individuals' self-esteem.
EXPERIMENT 1 GARLIC AND THE SINGLE MALE
In the ®rst experiment, we give male participants an opportunity to avail themselves of the bene®ts of the social-cognitive strategies, by giving them a transient, novel, but non-group-based stigma: bad breath. Males engaged in a brief conversation with an attractive female, who then provided the participant with either positive, moderately negative, or very negative feedback about their suitability as a dating partner. Half of each group of participants ate a mint candy prior to interacting, the other half ate a clove of raw garlic.
Because we were studying people who were newly stigmatized, with little experience in self-protective cognitions, we measured the simplest and most elemental form of attributional mechanismsÐdiscountingÐa process that is both cognitively and logically simple. Since at least as early as Freud (1915 Freud ( /1963 , scholars have argued that denial of information is one of the most primitive and earliest learned defense mechanisms. This ensured that participants with little experience with stigmatization would have a realistic opportunity to express self-esteem-protective cognitions.
We predict that men who have eaten garlic will discount a negative evaluation and attribute it to their breath signi®cantly more often than men who have eaten a mint. If the social-cognitive components of Crocker and Major's (1989) strategies are sucient to protect self-esteem, then we predict that when faced with negative feedback, the use of self-protective cognitions should lead men who have eaten garlic to have a higher level of self-esteem than men who have eaten a mint. In addition, if the attribution to the stigma (social-cognitive process) alone is eective to promote self-esteem, then we should ®nd a correlation between self-protective cognitions and self-esteem in the negative feedback conditions. However, if an identity-relevant Group identity-based self-protective strategies 359 group membership is necessary to protect self-esteem, then there should be no relationship between self-protective cognitions and self-esteem.
Method
Participants were 81 European±American undergraduate males who participated as part of a requirement for a psychology course. Participants were run through the procedure individually. The design of the study was a 2(garlic or mint) Â 3( positive, neutral, or negative feedback) between participants factorial.
Procedure
Participants were seated in a cubicle when they arrived and were informed that the study concerned the eects of breath on dating preferences, and that they would either eat a clove of garlic or a mint candy. Although it would have been ideal experimentally not to inform the participant of the alternative food to be eaten, we felt obligated ethically to tell the participant that he may have to eat either food. Participants were told that they could refuse to eat either food with no loss of experimental credit, and were given an opportunity to refuse prior to being informed of their assigned condition. This prevented dierential drop-out rates due to the aversiveness of eating raw garlic. Only one participant refused at this point. Participants were informed that they had been randomly assigned to the garlic (mint) condition. They were also told that after eating the garlic (mint), they would engage in a brief interaction with a member of the opposite sex. They were told that their partner had been assigned to the neutral condition, and therefore had not eaten anything that would aect her breath. Participants were informed that they would provide each other with feedback about how they came across during the interaction. Participants were told that the other participant did not know the purpose of the study, and therefore he should not tell her anything about what he had eaten.
The participant was then given either a clove of garlic or peppermint candy, along with the script of questions to ask his partner. He was told to take a few minutes and memorize the six questions while eating the garlic/mint, and that he could bring the list of questions with him.
The female confederate (who was seated in an adjacent cubicle during the early part of the experiment) was moved to a chair in the adjoining experimental room. The participant was brought in and seated in a chair 18 inches from the confederate. The confederate could not remain blind to food condition (the smell of garlic was potent), but she was trained to respond uniformly to all participants, irrespective of food condition. The confederate was blind to the feedback condition. Three dierent confederates were used.
The participant then asked the confederate the series of questions, and the confederate responded in a pleasant tone. The questions asked, along with the confederates' responses, are listed below:
(1) What is your name?`Barbara Miller' (2) What is your hometown?`Atlanta, Georgia' After the confederate answered the last question, the experimenter led the confederate and participant back to their cubicles. The experimenter then gave the participant a`Feedback Evaluation Sheet' that instructed the participant to rate his partner on such items as social skill, amount of eort the partner put into the interaction, how interesting the partner was, and how good a date the partner would be. The ratings on this sheet provide pre-feedback personality evaluations of the partner.
After the participant completed the rating sheet, he was given the same`Feedback Evaluation Sheet' ostensibly ®lled out by his partner. Participants in the Positive feedback condition received the highest or next to highest rating on each of the skills rated. Participants in the Neutral feedback condition received ratings at the midpoint across all of the skills rated. Participants in the Negative feedback condition received the lowest or next to lowest rating on all of the skills rated.
After the participants read the feedback, the experimenter then administered a series of questionnaires containing the primary dependent measures. After basic demographic questions, the questionnaire measured Discounting, a scale of three items (a 0.53):`How valid was the feedback you received from your partner?'`How much was your performance in the interaction a re¯ection of your social skills?' and Do you think that the feedback you received from your partner was a fair re¯ection of your personality?' To directly measure attributions to the stigma, participants answered the question`To what extent do you think your breath made the interaction go badly?' with higher scores corresponding to greater harm.
This was followed by the State Self-Esteem Scale (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) , a scale designed to measure transient changes in self-esteem. The scale measures three facets of state self-esteem: performance, social, and appearance. Examples of items on the performance subscale are`I feel con®dent about my abilities' and`I feel as smart as others'. Examples of items on the social subscale are`I feel self-conscious' and`I feel displeased with myself'. An example of items on the appearance scale is`I feel unattractive'. Heatherton and Polivy (1991) found all three subscales to possess both convergent and divergent validity. Because of the nature of the feedback in this situation, the Social self-esteem subscale is most directly relevant to the hypotheses.
At the end of the packet were manipulation check questions (all measured on 1±9 Likert-type scales). At this point the participants were debriefed, and those in the garlic condition were given a small cup of mouthwash and two peppermint candies.
Results

Manipulation Checks
Both the feedback and stigma manipulations were successful. In answer to`How well did your partner think that you performed during the interaction?' the means were in Group identity-based self-protective strategiesthe predicted order: Positive M 6.33, Neutral M 3.67, and Negative M 2.80, F(2,76) 23.78, p 5 0.0001, Z 0.62. In answer to`Did your partner like you?' the means were Positive M 6.83, Neutral M 3.58, and Negative M 2.44, F(2,76) 59.08, p 5 0.0001, Z 0.78.
Self-protective Cognitions
The discounting scale was submitted to a 2(Condition: garlic, mint) Â 3(Feedback: positive, neutral, negative) ANOVA. A strong eect of feedback was observed, F(2,75) 32.38, p 5 0.0001, Z 0.68, with less discounting associated with more positive feedback. In addition, participants in the Garlic condition discounted their feedback more than participants in the Mint condition, F(1,75) 5.88, p 5 0.02, Z 0.27. There was no interaction, F 5 1. The results are displayed in Figure 1 .
Likewise, we also analyzed attribution to breath with a 2(Condition: garlic, mint) Â 3(Feedback: positive, neutral, negative) ANOVA. Only a main eect of condition emerged; participants in Garlic conditions attributed feedback to garlic (M 5.29); in Mint conditions, not much attribution to breath was made (M 2.10), F(1,75) 50.75, p 5 0.0001, Z 0.60.
Self-esteem
The three self-esteem subscales were each submitted to the same 2(Condition: garlic, mint) Â 3(Feedback: positive, neutral, negative) ANOVA. There were no observable Although participants who received negative feedback had slightly less self-esteem than participants receiving positive feedback (Ms 3.76, 3.89, respectively), these dierences were not statistically signi®cant. However, the patterns of self-esteem within conditions proved remarkably informative about the self-protective cognitive processes, as described in the next section.
Self-protective Cognitions and Self-esteem
Next we looked at how the dierent self-protective cognitions aected self-esteem.
Since it appeared that participants in both the Neutral and Negative feedback conditions perceived their feedback as being negative, we have collapsed across Neutral and Negative feedback to compare those conditions to the Positive feedback condition. Discounting had little relationship to Overall self-esteem in the Neutral/Negative conditions (r 0.02), but it had a signi®cant negative association with self-esteem in the Positive condition (r À0.45, p 5 0.02). Attributions to breath were negatively correlated with Overall self-esteem in the Neutral/Negative conditions (r À0.13), while in the Positive condition these attributions were positively associated with Overall self-esteem (r 0.09). Neither of these correlations reached statistical signi®cance.
It was expected that since this study was set up in the context of dating and attractiveness Social self-esteem would be the most relevant of the State Self-Esteem subscales. Table 1 presents the correlations between discounting, attributions to the stigma, and the Social self-esteem subscale.
If the cognitive processes themselves buer and protect self-esteem, then we should expect a positive correlation between attributions to garlic and self-esteem, and a similar positive correlation between discounting and self-esteem, in the conditions of negative feedback when garlic is present. Instead, we ®nd the exact opposite pattern. In the Garlic condition with Neutral/Negative feedback, while there were no signi®cant eects of discounting, attributions to garlic were associated with lower Social self-esteem (r À0.39, p 5 0.05). Additionally, across all feedback conditions, Group identity-based self-protective strategies 363 attributions to garlic were signi®cantly negatively correlated with lower Social selfesteem (r À0.45, p 5 0.01).
Discounting the more positive feedback in the Mint conditions was associated with lower Social self-esteem (r À0.71, p 5 0.01). Attributions to breath were uncorrelated with Social self-esteem in this condition.
Discussion
The simple presence of a stigma had important eects on the interpretation of the social situation and the interpersonal feedback. The act of eating a clove of raw garlic had a direct impact on the believability of the feedbackÐparticipants in this study who ingested a clove of raw garlic engaged in more discounting than participants who had ingested a mint. People with an intrusive stigma appear to be less likely to accept social feedback at face value, regardless of its valence (see Ferrara, 1984; Kleck & Strenta, 1980) .
Although feedback or stigma did not aect self-esteem, use of self-protective cognitions did have an aect on self-esteem, but in the opposite direction of Crocker and Major's (1989) predictions. In the presence of negative feedback, attributions to breath were related to lowered overall self-esteem, as well as lower social self-esteem when the participant had eaten garlic. Self-protective cognitions were being used, but rather than protecting self-esteem, they were related to decrements in self-esteem.
What can account for the failure of these strategies to buer self-esteem? We suggest that the stigma provided to participants in this study, garlic-breath, did not provide participants with a meaningful group with which to identify, causing the selfprotective cognitions to lose their eectiveness. However, this conclusion is only tentative, given the failure of feedback or garlic breath to lower self-esteem. It is possible that the absence of lowered self-esteem in this study may be due to the fact that participants did not make an internal attribution when faced with negative feedbackÐthey were made to eat a garlic or a mint, therefore the negative feedback was not their fault. Yet we saw that external attributions to breath in the face of negative feedback was related to lower self-esteem. Paradoxically, the self-reported use of external attribution harmed rather than protected self-esteem.
Despite the fact that neither feedback nor the stigma of bad breath had any discernible eect on self-esteem, participants still noticed whether their partner gave them positive, neutral, or negative feedback, and it is clear that participants who ate garlic were aware of their stigma, since they engaged in discounting more often than participants who ate a mint. Obviously participants with garlic breath felt the need to address their stigma through discounting. Manipulating self-esteem with direct feedback is not as simple a task as one might expect. This diculty itself supports the spirit of the argument of Crocker and Major (1989) ; self-esteem is not a simple summary of the positive and negative outcomes one recently experiences.
Even though negative feedback or garlic breath did not by themselves lower selfesteem, participants increased their use of self-protective cognitions in the face of negative feedback and garlic, showing that they felt a need to employ the strategies in the situation. Yet, while stigmatization of bad breath from garlic aorded plenty of opportunity for discounting and for attributing negative feedback toward prejudice against the stigma itself, it provided very little opportunity for identifying with a 364
group (e.g., people with chronic halitosis). Self-protective cognitions in the absence of meaningful group membership proved unsuccessful.
EXPERIMENT 2 BLACK LIKE ME
To provide stronger evidence for the necessity of meaningful group membership for the success of self-protective cognitions, we follow up the garlic experiment with a study where participants are stigmatized on the basis of a meaningful group, but it is a group of which they are not a member. In Experiment 2, we manipulated stigma by leading the European±American participants into thinking that a (bogus) partner believed that they were actually an African±American person of the same sex. They were then either given very positive, or very negative feedback, and given an opportunity to attribute their feedback to their partners' prejudice. Although being falsely identi®ed as an African±American person allows one tò identify' with a stigmatized group and decide one has been a victim of anti-Black racism, in this case group identity involves actively disidentifying with his or her own group.
We predicted that participants who believed their partner thought they were African±American would use self-protective cognitions more often than participants who believed their partners thought they were European±American. If the mere opportunity to attribute prejudice to a meaningful group is sucient to buer selfesteem, then the use of self-protective cognitions should lead to higher self-esteem for participants who believed their partners thought they were African±American when compared to participants who believed their partners thought they were European± American. However, if membership in a meaningful group is instead needed in order for self-protective cognitions to be eective, then we do not expect a positive correlation between the cognitions and self-esteem.
Method
Participants were 93 European±American undergraduates (44 females, 49 males) from introductory psychology classes who participated in return for course credit. They were met outside the laboratory as soon as they arrived and whisked into an experimental room. They were told they were brought in quickly so that they would not meet the other participant in the experiment.
The experiment was explained to the participants as a study in how people's evaluations of another person would be aected by a certain amount of limited information:`We have kept you in dierent rooms, to be able to control the amount and kind of interaction that you have with each other. ' Participants were told that the study was about`how strangers form impressions of each other, and how these evaluations aect subsequent evaluations'. They were informed that they had been randomly assigned to a partner, and that both they and their partner would write an essay on parking problems on campus, and critique each other's essays. They were also told they would answer questions regarding their perceptions of their partner.
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The participant was then informed that the experiment was`really' about the eect of photographs on people's impression formation and evaluation of essay writing skills, and that the other participant was the`true' participant in the experiment. The experimenter then showed the participant the Polaroid color photograph that thè true' participant would see (either an African±American or European±American same-sex undergraduate was portrayed), and the experimenter commented,`As you can see, this is not you'. They were told that their partner would see this photo, and be told that it is a photo of the participant. Two participants expressed suspicion during debrie®ng, and were removed from analysis.
The participants then proceeded to write their essay, and exchanged essays with their partner for evaluation. The partner's essay was written by the experimenter, and was constructed to seem reasonably well-written for an undergraduate. It contained three arguments regarding parking on campus: (a) the university sells too many stickers, (b) the price of parking should go down, and (c) parking should be open to all students after 2:00 pm.
After participants read their partners' essays, they evaluated the essay on a 1±9 Likert scale format. Examples of questions included`How good or bad were your partner's arguments in dealing with the trac situation on campus?' and`How much eort do you think your partner put into writing the essay?' The feedback sheet also contained an item that asked participants to rate the quality of their partner's essay on a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 very low quality and 10 very high quality, and were given room to make any additional comments regarding the essay. Following the participant's evaluation of the essay, the experimenter`exchanged' evaluations.
The evaluation sheet from the partner contained the manipulation of feedback. In the Positive Feedback condition, responses indicated that the partner thought the participant did very well in completing the essay. For example, in response to the question`How good or bad were your partner's arguments?' the number closest tò very good' was circled. The essay was also given a`9', on the scale from 1 to 10, in overall quality. An additional comment,`I thought the essay was very good', was written.
In the Negative Feedback condition, responses indicated that the partner thought the participant did very poorly in writing the essay. For example, in response to the question`How good or bad were your partner's arguments?' the number closest tò very bad' was circled; the essay was given a`2' in quality. Finally, for additional comments`I thought the essay was very poor' was written. After the participants read their feedback, they were given the dependent measures and manipulation checks on a questionnaire. The participants were then completely debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.
Dependent Measures
Self-protective cognitions. This study measured three self-protective cognitions: discounting, attributions to racism, and a new strategy labeled`You just don't understand'. Three questions were used to create a single`Discounting' scale (a 0.61). These questions were`How valid was the feedback you received from your partner?'`How much was your performance on the essay a re¯ection of your skill?' and`Do you think the feedback you received from your partner was a fair re¯ection of 366
the merits of the paper?' Each of these items gets a dierent aspect of what it means tò accept' the feedback, with the sum of the items representing an overall tendency to view the feedback as representing a valid versus invalid indicator of the individuals' performance.
To measure Attributions to Racism, two questions were asked (a 0.59). In the section involving semantic dierential ratings of their partner on a 1±9 scale, we included a`racist/non-racist' item. And near the close of the questionnaire, participants were asked on a 1±9 scale`To what extent do you think that your partner's racial attitudes in¯uenced your partner's ratings of your essay?' with the low end labeled`Made absolutely no dierence' and high end labeled`Had a great deal of in¯uence'. This question was asked after very similar questions about the eect of the photo and the partner's political attitudes on the evaluations.
In addition to investigating attributions, we conceptualized and measured a new kind of self-protective strategy, called`You just don't understand'. This strategy was based on observing the use of a kind of self-protective strategy exempli®ed by a oncepopular T-shirt slogan seen around American college campuses:`It's a Black Thing, you wouldn't understand.' This self-protective strategy is based in the belief that feedback from outgroup members is mostly nondiagnostic, and thus devoid of valuable social information about the self, because outgroup members lack the basic understanding of cultural meanings and values. To measure the protective strategy of Doesn't Understand', participants were asked to respond to an item which read`To what extent do you think your partner really doesn't understand how your perspective and experiences aected your writing of the essay?' Participants responded on a 1±9 scale, with the low endpoint labeled`Understands me' and the high endpoint labeled Doesn't understand me'.
Partner rating. After the discounting measure, participants rated their partners on 11 semantic dierentials, including good±bad, kind±unkind, genuine±fake, closeminded±open-minded, thoughtful±not thoughtful, etc.
Self-esteem. The State Self-Esteem scale was used to measure participants' selfesteem following the experimental manipulations. In this experiment, we believed Performance self-esteem to be most relevant to positive and negative feedback.
In addition to the State Self-Esteem scale, participants rated their aect on eight semantic dierentials: Happy±Sad, Proud±Ashamed, Nervous±Calm, Anxious± Related, Smart±Dumb, Good±Bad, Strong±Weak, and Fast±Slow. Scores on these items were combined to create a single scale that we call Self-Relevant Aect. Factor analysis revealed a single factor (eigenvalue 4.5), accounting for 55.6 per cent of the variance, a 0.88.
Results
Manipulation Checks
In response to the question about essay performance, participants in the positive feedback conditions felt their partner on average rated their essay 2.3 on the 1±9 scale, Group identity-based self-protective strategieswhile participants in the negative feedback conditions felt their partner rated it 7.4, t(93) 12.38, p 5 0.001, Z 0.79 (low scores represent more positive evaluations).
Only the last 83 (out of 93) participants were asked the race and sex of the photo that was ostensibly shown to their partner. Of these, all but one indicated the correct race and sex, the mistaken participant was removed from further analysis.
Self-protective Cognitions
To test for eects of feedback and manipulated stigma, we submitted the selfprotective cognitions to a 3(Protective strategy: discounting, attributions to prejudice, doesn't understand) Â 2(Feedback: positive, negative) Â 2(Race of Photo: Black, White) mixed-model of ANOVA.
All three self-protective cognitions are notably more pronounced following negative feedback. However, each self-protective strategy had a dierent pattern of response to the photographs and feedback, F(2,172) 3.09, p 0.05. To unpack the eect of the three-way interaction, we submitted each strategy separately to a 2 Â 2(Feedback Â Photograph) ANOVA.
Discounting was much greater for negative (M 6.01) compared to positive (M 4.10) feedback, F(1,87) 48.81, p 5 0.001, Z 0.60. Discounting was unaected by whether the participant was presented with an African±American photograph (M 5.21) or a European±American photograph (M 4.90), F 5 1, and the interaction was not signi®cant, F(1,87) 1.57, ns, Z 0.13. Doesn't Understand was also more pronounced for negative (M 6.54) than positive feedback (M 3.42), F(1,88) 82.16, p 5 0.001, Z 0.69. Interestingly, participants who thought their partner was presented with a photograph of a European±American (M 5.30) felt less understood by their partner than participants who thought their partner was presented with a photograph of an African± American (M 4.66), F(1,88) 6.30, p 5 0.02, Z 0.26. There was no interaction, F 5 1.
Attributions to Racism produced the most complicated and sophisticated pattern of endorsement. Negative feedback (M 4.25) led to more attributions of racism than did positive feedback (M 2.85), F(1,87) 22.97, p 5 0.001, Z 0.46. In addition, attributions to racism were higher when participants believed that their partner was presented with a photograph of an African±American (M 4.07) instead of a European±American (M 3.03), F(1,87) 12.48, p 5 0.005, Z 0.35. Both of these eects were quali®ed by a signi®cant interaction, F(1,87) 4.10, p 5 0.05, Z 0.21. The pattern of means are displayed in Figure 2 . Negative feedback increased attributions to racism, but this increase was more than twice as large among participants who thought their partner believed that they were African±American, t(42) 4.12, p 5 0.001, d 1.20, than among those who thought their partner believed that they were European±American, t(45) 2.39, p 5 0.03, d 0.49.
Self-esteem and Self-related Aect
Eects of feedback on the self. To test the eects of the feedback on measures of selfesteem and self-related aect, we calculated a 3(Self-Esteem Subscale: performance, Crocker et al., 1993) , feedback did aect SelfRelevant Aect. A 2 Â 2(Race of Photograph Â Feedback) ANOVA uncovered a signi®cant eect of feedback, F(1,90) 11.60, p 5 0.001, Z 0.34, with those in the Negative conditions reporting less positive aect (M 4.58) than those in the Positive conditions (M 5.33) . Neither the eect of Race of Photograph nor the interaction were signi®cant (both Fs 5 1). The weak eect of feedback on State SelfEsteem and its stronger eect on Self-Relevant Aect suggest that the feedback manipulation did change, slightly, people's self-conceptions.
Eects of photo on the self. The eects of the photo on self were modeled in the same two ANOVAs described above. There were no eects of the Race of Photograph on Self-Relevant Aect; for both the main eect and interaction, Fs 5 1.
However, the Self-Esteem Scale by Photo interaction described above is displayed in Figure 3 . Leading the participants to believe that their partner thought they were African±American had dierential eects on the State self-esteem subscales; Group identity-based self-protective strategiespresentation of a photograph of an African±American led to slightly lower Performance and Social self-esteem scores, and an elevated Appearance self-esteem score. Subsequent t-tests of the subscales by photograph showed that none of the scales were signi®cantly dierent by photo, all ps 4 0.20. These data, in concert with the fact that in the overall ANOVA the Race of Photograph eect was not signi®cant, F 5 1, suggests that being shown the photograph eected a subtle re-ordering of the value of traits, somewhat downplacing Performance and Social self-esteem, and resulting in an emphasis on Appearance self-esteem.
Self-protective Cognitions and Self-concept
To determine whether the self-protective cognitions were associated with current selfconcept, we correlated the three cognitions with the State Self-Esteem subscales and Self-Relevant Aect. The results are displayed by feedback in Table 2 . There is little evidence that the use of self-protective cognitions is associated with the self-concept variables. (Note that calculating correlations collapsed across feedback is not appropriate, because the feedback manipulation simultaneously decreased self-esteem and increased self-protective strategy use, which would create a spurious negative correlation.)
To determine whether the presence of a potential stigma (i.e. African±American Photograph conditions) had any eect, we calculated the same correlations in the table by Condition and Race of Photograph. Of the 48 correlations, only one correlation was signi®cant. Participants in the African±American Photograph/ Positive Feedback condition showed a negative correlation between Performance selfesteem and Doesn't Understand, r À0.43, n 21, p 0.05. We interpret these Christian S. Crandall et al. data to suggest that the use of self-protective cognitions had few immediate implications for the self-concept in this study.
Discussion
Once again, feedback manipulations had little eect on self-esteem per se, but negative feedback reduced positive self-relevant aect (the same results reported by Crocker et al., 1991, Study 1) . On the other hand, all of the self-protective cognitions were vigorously endorsed in the face of negative feedback, as numerous selfenhancement theories would predict. Discounting was a straightforward result of negative feedback; similar to a wide range of previous studies, the more negative the feedback, the more it is denied. It seems that participants were more concerned with the feedback they received than the race of the photograph that their partner was shown, since the expected eect of the race of the photograph on discounting did not appear. Perhaps the lack of stigma eects on discounting occurred because it was easier to attribute negative feedback to racism rather than discount it. Participants attributed negative feedback to their partner's racism when they thought their partner was shown an African±American photograph. Hence, when participants believed they were being negatively evaluated as an African±American person, they reported being evaluated, not based on the content of their character, but by the color of their skin. Although the participants had had only a few moments' experience as a member of a stigmatized racial group, they rapidly claimed victim status.
Participants used the`You just don't understand' strategy as well, when confronted with negative feedback. They endorsed this strategy more when confronted with a photograph of a European±American than with a photograph of an African± American, although this was a much smaller eect. Feeling understood rapidly diminished with negative feedback, and to a lesser extent with the manipulation of stigma. We encourage others to think about this self-protective strategy, which had Group identity-based self-protective strategies 371 the largest mean dierence between positive and negative feedback of all the measured strategies. Finally, as in Experiment 1, we did not ®nd evidence that the use of the selfprotective cognitions themselves were associated with high levels of self-esteem. In Experiment 1, discounting and attributions to the stigma were negatively correlated with self-esteem; in Experiment 2, there was no correlation at all.
Although participants were provided with the opportunity to use numerous selfprotective cognitions, these cognitions in the absence of group identi®cation were not correlated with self-esteem or self-relevant aect. In contrast to the stigma of garlic breath in Experiment 1, these participants were able to use a real and plausible (albeit temporary) stigmatized group membership as a way to defend their self-concepts. Still, the group membership of another race had little relevance to their self-concept, and its endorsement would have required a denial of their own relatively privileged group status. As in Experiment 1, the absence of meaningful group membership could be the cause of the ineectiveness of the self-protective cognitions. However, these conclusions are tentative, as they are based on null results. A further test of the hypothesis would be to compare these outcomes to a situation where individuals have access to meaningful group membership in their use of self-protective cognitions.
EXPERIMENT 3 SELF-PROTECTIVE PROPERTIES OF PREJUDICE
To provide an additional test of the hypothesis that self-protective cognitions derive their potency from meaningful group membership, we created a third experiment in which an important and genuine group membership (gender) is made acutely stigmatizing. Women faced evaluation from a partner who was described as either prejudiced against women, or not. While in the two previous experiments, the suciency of self-protective cognitions was tested in the absence of group membership, this experiment made group membership salient to participants without the opportunity to engage in self-protective cognitions.
Attributions of negative feedback to prejudice should bolster the self-esteem of a member of a stigmatized, but meaningful, group. As an extension of this, we predicted that mere knowledge that an evaluator is prejudiced, in the absence of negative feedback, will lead to an increase in self-esteem. Thus, women who believe that their evaluator is prejudiced against members of their gender group should exhibit the same or higher level of self-esteem than women who do not believe their evaluator is prejudiced.
Thus, this study is dierent from the previous two studies in that no negative feedback is given, and no opportunity to display the self-protective cognitions is aorded. Instead, a meaningful group membership is made salient. We predict that the self-protective nature of cognitions like attributions to prejudice and discounting buer self-esteem primarily through the power of making group membership salient, rather than as a rational cognitive process. If group membership is indeed the driving force behind self-protective cognitions, making membership in a group salient should enhance individuals' self-esteem.
In Experiment 3, female participants discovered that their anonymous communication partner was either prejudiced against women or not. They were then asked 372
questions about their motivation to make a good impression on the partner in an impending communication exercise, whether they thought their partners were biased against them, and how well they thought they would do on the upcoming exercise. Participants also ®lled out the State Self-Esteem scale.
Method
Participants
Participants were 45 women recruited from introductory psychology classes and were given partial class credit for their participation. We chose female participants in this study to look at whether prejudice against a stigmatized but meaningful group was sucient to increase participants' self-esteem, because women more often than men experience gender-based stigma.
Procedure
Participants were run either one or two at a time. Participants were met by a female experimenter singly on a dierent¯oor from where the experiment was taking place and were escorted to the research room, where they were seated in separate cubicles that were each equipped with a computer and a modem line. They were told that the study was about the role of communication skills and information control in impression formation on the Internet. The experimenter informed them that they would be interacting over the Internet with a communication partner, and that their exchange would be anonymous, except for certain types of information that would be exchanged beforehand. Speci®cally, partners would exchange Internet opinion information with each other before communicating with each other over the computers. When participants were run singly, the experimenter opened and shut another cubicle door at dierent times during the experiment in order for it to seem like there was another participant there. Participants who were run two at a time were told that the other participant (whom they never saw) was their communication partner. In reality, these two participants never interacted. Participants in all conditions were ®rst given items from the Miller's Analogy Test (Sternberg, 1974) , which they were told was a written measure of their Internet communication abilities. After completing the test, participants were given an opinion form to ®ll out while the experimenter`computed' their score. Participants answered the items by circling a number from 0 to 100. The important item was`How well do women communicate clearly and successfully on the Internet in comparison to men?' (0±not well at all, to 100±equally well). They were told that this questionnaire would be exchanged with their communication partner, and that they would be able to see how their partner responded for these items.
After a short period, the experimenter returned to the cubicle with the participant's Internet communication score. The experimenter took the participant's opinion questionnaire and left her to read a sheet explaining her score. All participants received a high score on their written Internet communication test.
Prejudice and Self-esteem
Participants' self-esteem was increased by the perception of prejudiced attitudes in their communication partners. Individuals who thought that their partners were prejudiced against women had higher Overall scores on the State Self-Esteem scale (M 4.13, N 23) than the baseline of participants who thought that their partner was not prejudiced (M 3.89, N 21) , t(42) 2.76, p 5 0.01, Z 0.39. In a subsequent 2(Condition: prejudiced, tolerant) Â 3(Self-Esteem Subscale: performance, social, appearance) ANOVA, we determined that the Subscale Â Condition was not signi®cant, F 5 1. In general, these data support the hypothesis that being confronted with prejudice toward one's group, in the absence of feedback, can serve to increase self-esteem across appearance, social, and performance subscales.
Answers to the question`How biased do you think your partner might be against you?' (1 not at all biased, 9 extremely biased) can be thought of as a measure of anticipatory`attributions' to prejudice (`anticipatory' because participants had not received any performance feedback from their partner with which to make attributions). Participants in the prejudice condition thought that their partner was signi®-cantly more biased than participants in the no-prejudice condition (Ms 6.14, 3.33, respectively), t(42) 4.60, p 5 0.0001, Z 0.58. Therefore, participants inferred from their partners' biased statements about women in general that the partners would also be biased against them as individuals.
Self-protective Cognitions and Self-esteem
Looking at the most relevant measure of self-esteem in this studyÐPerformance selfesteemÐwhen participants were faced with a partner who was not prejudiced, perception of bias was not correlated with Performance self-esteem (r 0.03, N 21), p 4 0.50). However, when the partner was prejudiced, perception of bias was marginally positively correlated to Performance self-esteem (r 0.36, N 23, p 5 0.10). These correlations were even stronger with overall self-esteem: when participants faced a non-prejudiced partner, perception of bias was at best modestly correlated with self-esteem (r 0.23, p 4 0.25), but when the partner was prejudiced, the correlation was strong, positive (r 0.53), and signi®cant ( p 5 0.01). Due to our relatively small N per cell, these dierences between the correlations are only marginally statistically signi®cant from each other (Fisher's Z À1.07 and À1.10, respectively, both ps 5 0.15).
Motivation and Prejudice
The prejudiced attitudes of one's partner also aected participants' motivation to make a good impression, in the opposite direction of self-esteem. Participants who thought their partners were prejudiced were less motivated to make a good impression on their partners than those who did not think their partners were prejudiced Ms 6.70, 7.43 respectively), t(42) 2.07, p 5 0.05, Z 0.18.
Group identity-based self-protective strategiesstigmatized group members. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that self-protective cognitions alone are not associated with increased self-esteem in the face of negative feedback. Experiment 3 showed that being a member of a meaningful group is sucient to increase self-esteem when faced with a prejudiced evaluator. While the patterns of discounting, attributions, and other self-protective cognitions diered between experimental situations, the critical issue is that in both Experiments 1 and 2, a number of self-protective cognitions are reported, but they are not positively correlated with self-esteem.
Both newly stigmatized individuals and individuals with a group-based stigma engaged in self-protective cognitions. However correlations between these cognitions and self-esteem appeared only when the stigma was group-based. When participants were given a stigma (garlic-breath) but no stigmatized group, or given a stigmatized group (being identi®ed as African±American) but without legitimate membership, participants engaged in self-protective cognitions, but did not reap the predicted selfesteem bene®ts. Only when the stigma (gender) was related to an important group membership did self-esteem rise in the face of prejudice, and the self-protective cognitions were correlated with self-esteem. The data reported here, in conjunction with those of Britt and Crandall (in press ) and Harvey and Crandall (submitted) , suggest that the self-protective cognitions, in and of themselves, are insucient to protect self-esteem. Instead, these cognitions can only play a role when they exist in the context of a social identity with a meaningful group.
An alternative explanation might posit that only members of groups which have a history of discrimination are able to use self-protective cognitions eectively. Perhaps individuals need practice in the use of self-protective strategies before they are able to buer self-esteem. Unfortunately, having a history of discrimination is confounded with being a member of a meaningful group in this set of studiesÐfuture research to tease apart discrimination history and meaningful group membership would need to examine a group that had little experience with discrimination, but provided stigmatized individuals with a meaningful group, or conversely a group that had experience with discrimination but failed to provide meaningful group membership. However, if one considers heavyweight women to ®t in the category of a group with a history of discrimination, but no meaningful group membership (Crocker et al., 1993) , then it is possible that having a history of discrimination is not sucient to buer a stigmatized individual's self-esteem.
Another possible puzzle in these sets of studies is the fact that the use of selfprotective cognitions was negatively associated with self-esteem when the stigma was garlic breath (Experiment 1) and uncorrelated with self-esteem when the stigma was being mistaken for a dierent race (Experiment 2). However, this fact is not as puzzling as it may seem. In fact, a positive aspect of this group of studies is the use of many dierent, nonconventional stigmas. Garlic breath is very much a dierent stigma from being mistaken for a person of a minority racial group. Therefore, one would expect the patterns of strategy use and their relationship to self-esteem to dier. More importantly, while these two very dierent stigmas did elicit the use of selfprotective cognitions, they did not serve to protect self-esteem. What these two stigmas do share are the ineectiveness of their respective self-protective cognitions, and a lack of meaningful group membership.
Not all stigmas are linked to meaningful groups. Some stigmas are highly individuating, for example people with severe facial dis®gurements tend not to be seen collectively as a group, and there is little interaction among the potential group members (Goman, 1963) . These stigmas are individuating; they make people feel unique, separate, lonely (Crandall & Coleman, 1992) , and vigilant (Frable, Blackstone, & Scherbaum, 1990) . Individuating stigmas lack connection to a meaningful group, and we would therefore expect that self-protective cognitions related to these stigmas would be ineective in protecting self-esteem.
Other stigmas have the potential for group-based identity, but the members avoid identi®cation because of low perceived status of the group, or members may perceive the group boundary as permeable, and the possibility of escaping the stigma may hinder group identi®cation (Ellemers, 1993) . For example, fat people tend not to identify highly with their weight group (Crandall, 1994) , in part because they believe that they could lose weight and evade the perception of stigma. It is not surprising then, to discover that Crocker et al. (1993) found that attributions to the stigma of being overweight were associated with negative aect among heavyweight women. Without the bene®ts of identi®cation with a meaningful group, the self-protective strategy of attributing outcomes to prejudice provides scant protection against the loss of self-esteem.
Although the importance of group membership has not been much discussed in the context of self-protective cognitions, there is much precedent in the literature for linking meaningful group membership with self-esteem. Identi®cation with a meaningful group has been shown to maintain personal and collective self-esteem (Branscombe et al., 1999; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997; Turner et al., 1987) . According to social identity theory, attributions and stereotypes are not isolated events in the individual, but are motivated processes that re¯ect relationships among groups (Oakes et al., 1994; Tajfel, 1981) . These motivations associated with group membership may work in concert with attributions in order to protect the selfconcept of stigmatized individuals. For example, Taylor and Jaggi (1974) demonstrated that group membership aects attributions of socially undesirable behaviors, with external attributions being made for ingroup members, and internal attributions being made for outgroup members performing the same act. Additionally, individuals who have high ethnic identity (Phinney, Cantu, & Kurtz, 1997) or who show ingroup favoritism tend to have higher self-esteem (Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Oakes & Turner, 1980) . Research on social identity has found results similar to Crocker and Major's (1989) idea of selective devaluing, with individuals whose ingroup has been derogated on a particular characteristic downplaying that characteristic's importance to their ingroup (Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986) .
Stigmatized group identi®cation has also been shown to directly aect self-esteem. Among Hispanic students at predominantly European±American universities, students with stronger ethnic identi®cation perceive less threat in the university environment and exhibit increases in their self-esteem (Ethier & Deaux, 1994) . Similarly, among the deaf community, group identi®cation predicts high self-esteem (Bat-Chava, 1994) . This relationship between self-esteem and group identity holds true more often for members of stigmatized groups than for members of relatively nonstigmatized groups. For example, racial and ethnic identity predict self-esteem in African±Americans, but not European±Americans (Goodstein & Ponterotto, 1997) . Thus group identi®cation, especially when it entails membership in a stigmatized group, can work to preserve and enhance self-esteem (Tajfel, 1981) .
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The mobilization of group identi®cation may help group members' use of selfprotective cognitions. In the USA, both the civil rights movement and the women's movement are examples of group identi®cation interventions that increased the salience of group membership, and also challenged the justi®cation of discrimination directed toward women and minorities. When women and minorities strongly identi®ed with their groups, and labeled their treatment as discrimination, they increased the cohesion and meaningfulness of their group, which increased selfesteem (e.g. de Beauvoir, 1968; Carmichael & Hamilton, 1967) . Politicization includes identi®cation, which in turn reduces the justi®cation of discrimination. Once politicized, and hence identi®ed, a stigmatized person can reap the bene®ts of the self-protective cognitions.
Stigmatized group members do not often show the low self-esteem that one would expect from the negative feedback that accompanies stigmatization. However, rather than simply being buered by self-protective mechanisms such as attributions to prejudice, maintenance of stigmatized individuals's self-esteem seems to require membership in an important identity group. Rather than being a curious attributional puzzle, the self-protective properties available to stigmatized groups may be based on the high identi®cation of their members and strong cohesion within the group (Bat-Chava, 1994; Branscombe et al., 1999; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Phinney et al., 1997) .
Typically, one ®nds a trade-o between self-esteem enhancement and motivation (e.g. Harvey & Crandall, submitted) . In contrast, meaningful group identi®cation can serve not only to protect individuals' self-esteem, but may also be a precursor to social change (Branscombe & Ellemers, 1998) . The use of self-protective cognitions paired with a high group identity might both motivate group members toward social action while simultaneously enhancing self-esteem.
